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»White Men Can't Jump...«
Objectivity and Fiction 
Oto Luthar
»A different reality is possible«, 
he defended himself 
»if only you succeed in looking 
left and right from your own nose«
Juan Octavio Paz, Everyday pedagogics
A us Absicht und Stoff entsteht die Form«, claimed Ranke.1 Ranke still 
believed in a mission. He also believed in a higher law. »Telling it 
like it was« was his ideal and this was an event in itself in human comprehen­
sibility, yet also a relic. Objectivity, even though »farblos«, »abgebrochend« 
or »ermiident erscheinen« had to be »ein Stück historischer Arbeiten«. He 
would sooner admit to a defeat »am Ende hat man's nicht erreicht« than the 
possibility of something creative, (with narrative) interfering with the world 
that was »ein andere«.
*
»White men can't jump«, says Sidney Deane (Wesley Snipes) to his partner 
Billy Hoyle (Woody Harrelson) in the film2 of the same title. Sidney does not 
believe anything (or very little) except that the truth is what is most advanta­
geous at the moment, absurd as it may be, just like the statement that white 
men can't dunk. Sidney Deane does not only believe that nowadays one
1 Leopold von Ranke, »Über die Verwandschaft und Unterschied der Historie und Politik«, 
Wolfgang Hardtwig, Über das Studium der Geschichte, dtv, Munich, 1990.
2 The film 'White Men Can't Jump1 by Ron Shelton is a well meant criticism o f the rationality of 
the white race and its major characteristics: exaggerated obstinacy, determination and vanity. 
The story is about two team mates, sometime friends, who play basketball for money. An 
African American, played by Wesley Snipes, who looks at life very pragmatically, is still quite 
natural in his outlook and always has to explain to his white team colleague, played by Woody 
Harrelson, that one sometimes has to let loose...
Fil. vest. /Acta Phil., XV (2/1994), 187-198.
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manipulae the world but he also knows that it is necessary if one wishes to 
survive. To him and to Billy's girlfriend, who tries to reason with Billy in the 
best possible way that sometimes you win even if you lose or lose even if it 
looks as though you won, interpretation is everything...
*
Of a similar nature is the premise that »blacks have the lowest IQs« as was 
statistically (read »objectively«) claimed by Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles 
Murray in their book called The Bell Curve3. Leaving aside the absurd of such 
»scientific« procedure and opting for methodology, soon leads again to the 
imaginary principle of objectivity. The »result« was -  as is stressed repeatedly
-  acquired on the basis of measurements and was therefore supposed to be 
objective, legitimating the authors their claims and procedures...
*
The statements expressed above are by way of an introduction to the following 
contemplation upon relations between objectivity and fiction, and are either 
chosen at random or are the result of work on different topics (the history of 
modem racism, discourses on nationalism) carried out by the author recently.
The final metaphorical starting-point -  and a current example of the principle 
of objectivity -  was chosen to stress the fact that this principle is taken to an 
absurd conclusion in certain quasi-scientific debates on the various cognitive 
capacities of different races. Above all, this is a clear example that often 
factual data are not in dispute4, but the interpretation of the data is.
11n the book with the significant subtitle: »Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life«,
the authors try to support three important claims: that Asians have a higher average IQ than 
white people; that most immigrants come from groups with lower IQs; and that the IQ score o f 
black people in Africa is »substantially below« the black American average. Each o f these 
seemingly formally objective claims has a  key role in the formulation o f  The Bell Curve's 
broader suggestions about the relationship between race, heredity, IQ and social structure. (See 
also the article by Charles Lane: »The Tainted Sources of'T he Bell Curve'« in the New York
Review o f  Books, Volume XLI, No 20., p. 14 -  19.)
4 One o f the greatest absurdities o f such an approach was the assertion about inferior black 
African intelligence which has particularly far-reaching implications. Namely, » if it can be 
shown that low IQ can be taken as being predictive o f  social ills such as crime, poverty and 
unstable families, current views o f Africa and o f  the sources o f  its tragic problems would have 
to be significantly revised ... And a lower African IQs could also be taken as refuting the claim 
that black Americans' lower IQ is a legacy o f  racism, assuming, as Murray and Herrnstein put 
it, that 'the African black population has not been subjected to the historical legacy o f American 
black slavery and discrimination, and might therefore have higher scores' (p. 288)«. Referrals 
to the racist explanations o f authors such as Richard Lynn are especially problematic. He claims 
»that genetic mental superiority o f the Jews may be a happy Darwinian by-product o f 
'intermittent persecutions which the more intelligent may have been able to foresee and
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This also shows the variable costs incurred by the principle of objective 
interpretation in general. The price can be high -  consider that between 
Ranke's times and the present it has several times been proven that the criterion 
of objectivity is an illusion -  nonetheless this issue is one of the main issues of 
the philosophy of history and the modern theory of historiography. This 
becomes obvious by careful reading of some of Ranke's theoretical papers. 
Similar facts can be proven by the analysis of letters to his closest contempo­
rary Droysen, who established as early as in the middle of the 19th century 
that it is our imagination that determines particular phenomena in space and 
time and not some criterion of objectivity. (Droysen, 1856/57, 1882).
What (other) purpose can the establishment of some (selective) criterion, for 
which it was clear from the outset that it will not be easily accessible or not 
accessible at all, serve?
With such emphasis on the principle of objectivity, a certain (moral, political, 
or aesthetic...) concept can still be established and preserved. In Ranke's 
philosophy, it was political interest (politics/science, everyday political prac­
tice and politics as a long term process of strictly controlled change and 
leadership...) and a wish for a working definition of the relationship between 
politics and historiography or history. For the authors of the later period, 
especially the historians, the following statement, which Freud once said was 
true of biographers, is also true for historians: sooner or later they fall in love 
with the subject of their study. Some of them may truly feel some kind of inner 
mission and in their images of themselves and the world become part of the 
events, creators of politics, cultures, etc., while over everything, in their 
professional opinion, hovers the law of objectivity...
For historiography of the 19th century and for the final codification of history 
as a national science this entails the end of the belief that historiography is a 
literary art or a part of rhetoric, and historiography is no longer just a profes­
sion, a job or a mission, but becomes an (objective) science (with stress on 
both, the »objective« and »science«) and of course an act of patriotism...
This of course creates some crucial changes, in the manner of interpretation, 
with the entire set of categories replaced. Rather than fact and fantasy, the 
terms truth and error are introduced, and this is important for the present 
discussion on relations between the objective and subjective or fictional form 
of representation (interpretation), where the truth and the fact have become 
equal. Fiction in this case is represented as a sheer opposition to the first, as an
escape'«. (See Richard Lynn, »Civilization and the Quality o f Population«, Journal o f  Social, 
Political and Economic Studies, Vol. 16. No. 1 (Spring 1991), p. 123. Here quoted from Charles 
Lane, »The Tainted Sources...«, p. 16).
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obstacle to the comprehension of reality. History was opposed to fiction (a 
term mostly associated with novels), a literary form, which, contrary to imag­
ining what was real, dealt with imagining what was possible, in short some­
thing that can only be imagined but does not really exist. According to Hayden 
White (White, 1982) this brought about a fantasy of an historical discourse 
consisting only of statements that can be verified by facts... but mostly the goal 
of historians of the 19th century was to erase every trace of the fictional or 
merely imaginable from their discourse. It was a case of the thorough preven­
tion and denial of poetic or rhetorical procedures and the avoidance of what 
might be characterised as an intuitive procedure by the author. All this of 
course did not happen suddenly, but the process of formalization of historiog­
raphy, with several detours, lasted more than a century.
To make these issues clearer let us examine some of the basic characteristics 
of this transition:
From story to morality
At the end of the 17th century, the western European world was still enchanted 
by Roman and Greek history, rediscovered during the Renaissance. Historiog­
raphy was similar in tone to novel writing, full of awe and respectfulness 
toward the idealized-virtuous citizens of Rome and Athens. Contemporaries 
were constantly compared to paragons of virtue from the ancient past, and the 
crude language of the chroniclers of mediaeval Europe was simultaneously 
criticised. If someone wished to learn something more about the contemporary 
history of his own environment, he/she had to, according to the French 
example, read genealogical narratives of noble families which were almost 
without exception derived from other sources. These were, like du Haillan, for 
example full of »such dirty and low words that can only reflect the thoughts of 
crooks and rude men... (and) ...by no means reflect the thoughts of kings and 
virtuous men« (Aries 1988). The writers of these »stories« were in his opinion 
so distant in tone from statesmanlike language that they were incapable of sane 
judgement.
Authors of a later period were mostly satisfied by using »sources« that were 
clarified versions of »vulgar« stories modified to the tastes of their time. Like 
Anquetil, who freely claimed that Histoire de la France is a compilation, they 
principally tried to establish which version of the subject was best presented in 
the works of their predecessors. The chosen »narrative« was then supple­
mented by whatever they believed to be missing and their actions were 
justified by the claim that the public was supposedly in need of activation by a 
suitable traditional version and that the possible literalization of such narra-
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tives was recommendable only on the condition that it did not change the 
established order of things. According to Aries, for generations up to the end 
of the 16th century, people were comfortable with the monotony of a message 
that was always the same and the contents of which were, according to their 
beliefs, determined forever. Only changes in style, rhetoric or extension were 
allowed.
On the other hand, the same authors avoided quoting original sources and the 
original texts. Moreover, the accurate presentation of »manuscripts«, as origi­
nals were called, was considered to be a barbaric act, a tedious unravelling of 
fragmentary texts, the details of which were »impossible to include into 
general history anyway«. They saw their mission as modifying this original 
»substance« according to the tastes of their own period. A high style, free of 
blasphemies, tasteless jokes and proverbs was used.
At the end of the 17th century, however, the need to constitute modem 
national history arose, yet until the end of the 18th century it was still in its 
ancient (dis)guise. Its purpose was to rehabilitate previous national rulers and 
to fabricate new national heroes (a good example of this is provided by a 
comparison of important figures of the French revolution with ancient heroes 
or gods). All this lead to a new comprehension of historiography. For instance, 
from this moment on, an historical figure such as Klodovik was no longer 
depicted as bloodthirsty and Dagobert as being fearful. Klodovik II and his 
successors, although still reprehensible rulers, were no longer deemed lazy 
thugs, rude men, but people worthy of respect as part of national history.
History became an act of patriotism and gradually changed into a collection of 
moral and political lessons. For Furetier, a French historian of the early 18th 
century, history is nothing more than »morality, reduced to acts and ex­
amples« (Aries, pp 135-136) that is offered to people as a reflection of their 
mistakes. This is a serious announcement of a constitutive phase of classic, 
nationally oriented historiography, which, in addition to introducing (educa­
tional) dialogue with its public, also explicitly recognises it for the first time. 
The climax of this process was the scientification of historiography. But 
before this actually took place, France (at the time still determining the 
orientation of western historiography) was still under the influence of the 
romantically colourful generation of Thierry, and above all Michelet, who, in 
his »authentic« report, dealt with the events of the past with the same »alien 
character«, or otherness that was characteristic of fiction. The strictly scien­
tific approach to history was a reaction tothe previous forms of extremely 
literally-oriented and mythologised historiography. The paths later taken by 
historical practice do not only include defictionalisation but also démythification 
o f any domain of inquiry and representation.
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History and science
History, the realistic science par excellence, was set up as superior to fiction as 
the study of the real in conrast to the study of the merely imaginable. One 
might also consider the words of White: »Although Ranke had in mind that 
form of the novel which we have since come to call Romantic, when he 
castigated it as mere fancy, he manifested a prejudice shared by many of his 
contemporaries, when he defined history as the study of the real and the novel 
as the representation of the imaginary. Only a few theoreticians, among whom 
J.G.Droysen was the most prominent, saw that it was impossible to write 
history without having recourse to the techniques of the orator and the poet. 
Most of the 'scientific' historians of the age did not see that for every identifi­
able kind of novel, historians produced an equivalent kind of historical dis­
course. Romantic historiography produced its genius in Michelet, Realistic 
historiography its paradigm in Ranke himself, Symbolist historiography pro­
duced Burchardt (who had more in common with Flaubert and Baudelaire than 
Ranke), and Modernist historiography its prototype in Spengler. It was no 
accident that the Realistic novel and Rankean historicism entered their respec­
tive crisis at roughly the same time«. (White 1982:124)
Nevertheless, we can say that there were several styles of historic presentation 
in the past, but only until the beginning of 19th century, but that a generation 
of »scientific« historiographers did not acknowledge these, being »captive of 
the illusion that one could write history without employing any fictional 
techniques whatsoever«, or as White says »they continued to honour the 
conception of the opposition of history to fiction throughout the entire period, 
even while producing forms of historical discourse different from one another, 
and that their grounding in aesthetic preconceptions of the nature of historical 
process alone could explain those differences. Historians continued to believe 
that different interpretations of the same set of events were functions of 
ideological distortions or of inadequate factual data«. They also believed that 
»if one only eschewed ideology and remained true to the facts, history would 
produce a knowledge as certain as anything offered by the physical sciences 
and as objective as a mathematical exercise«. (White 1982:125).
They did not realise, however, that facts do not speak for themselves but that 
historians speak for them, that they speak on their behalf and combine the 
fragments of the past into a whole »whose integrity is -  in its representation -  
a purely discursive one. Novelists might be dealing only with imaginary 
events whereas historians are dealing with real ones, but the process of fusing 
events, whether imaginary or real, into a comprehensive totality, capable of 
serving as the object of representation, is a poetic process«. Here the historian 
must utilise precisely the same strategies, the same modalities of representing
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relationships in terms that the poet or novelist uses. These fragments have to 
be put together to make a whole of a particular, not general, nature. (White 
1982:125)
We might almost agree with White yet at the same time ask ourselves on what 
basis it is possible to claim that historical discourse has more factors in 
common with, than, distinct from, not with the process of novel writing. The 
first basis -  for White -  is to be found in recent developments in literary theory
-  especially in the fact that modem structuralists and literary reviewers insist 
on the necessity of dissolving the distinction between prose and poetry in order 
to identify their shared attributes as a form of linguistic behaviour that on one 
side, are as much constitutive of their objects of representation as they are 
reflective of external reality, and projective of internal emotional states on the 
other. White even refers to Stalin and his claim that language belonged neither 
to the superstructure nor the base of cultural praxis, and especially stresses that 
language is the instrument of mediation between consciousness and the world 
it inhabits. If this is nothing new for literary theoreticians, it is new for 
historians who are »buried in the archives, hoping by what they call a 'sifting 
of the facts' or 'the manipulation of data' to find the form of the reality that will 
serve as the object of representation in the account that they will write when 
'all the facts are known' and they have finally 'got the story straight'«. (White 
1982:126)
Similar views were shared by White in the early seventies in his work 
»Metahistory«, where he claimed, referring to literary theory, that 'poetising' is 
not an activity that hovers over reality (White 1973:IX). Some fifteen years 
later he claims that we are therefore no longer compelled »to believe -  as 
historians in the post-Romantic period had to believe -  that fiction is the 
antithesis of fac t... or that we can relate facts to one another without the aid of 
some enabling and generally fictional matrix«. (White 1982:126). In his opin­
ion, this would also prove to be a useful cognition for historians if they weren't 
»so fetishistically enamoured of the notion of 'facts'« and because of that »so 
congenitally hostile to 'theory' in any form that the presence in a historical 
work of a formal theory used to explicate the relationship between facts and 
concepts is enough to cam them the charge of having defected to the despised 
sociology or of having lapsed into the nefarius labelled philosophy of history«.
The height of White's insight was his reference to Nietzsche who claimed that 
every discipline is constituted of what it forbids its practitioners to do. In his 
opinion (which is put into one of the constitutive theses of contemporary 
theory of historiography), no other science has as many taboos as professional 
historiography. Those taboos are present »so much so that the so-called 
'historical method' consists of little more than the injunction to 'get the story
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straight' (without any notion of what the relation of 'story' to 'fact' might be) 
and to avoid both conceptual overdetermination and imaginative excess .„at 
any price.«
The price to pay for this is a considerable one. »It has resulted in the repression 
of the conceptual apparatus« (without which single facts cannot be aggregated 
into complex macrostructures and constituted as objects of discursive repre­
sentation in a historical narrative) and the relegation of the poetic moment in 
historical writing to the interior of the discursive (where it functions as the 
unacknowledged -  and therefore uncriticisable -  content of historical narra­
tive).
It is nowadays impossible to draw a firm line between history and philosophy 
of history because the difference is only that »the latter brings the conceptual 
apparatus by which the facts are ordered in the discourse to the surface of the 
text, while history proper (as it is called) buries it in the interior of the 
narrative, where it serves as a hidden or implicit shaping device...«. Such 
distinctions lead to the fact that »historians usually work with much less 
linguistic (and therefore less poetic) self-consciousness than writers of fiction 
do«, or even worse, it leads to the situation where »the persona of the author 
appears nowhere identifiable in the text« and where historians aim to be »clear 
what technical terms mean, when they dare to use any«.
Beyond sanctions?
The problem is that contemporary historians in refer to such authors as 
Thucydides, Tacitus, Michelet, Ranke, Droysen, Tocqueville and Burchardt 
support of their views, and forget that these historians at least had a rhetorical 
self-consciousness that permitted them to recognise that any set of factors was 
variously and equally legitimately, describable. »There is no such thing as a 
single correct original description of anything, on the basis of which an 
interpretation ofthat can consequently be brought to bear.« (White 1982:127).
»They recognised, in short, that all original descriptions of any field of 
phenomena are already interpretations of its structure and that linguistic mode 
in which the original description ... of the field is cast, will implicitly rule out 
certain modes of representation and modes of explanation regarding the field's 
structure, and tacitly sanction others.« In other words, it is true that every form 
of description is already limited by the range of »modes of emplotment« and 
»modes of argument« which serve to disclose the meaning of the field in a 
discursive prose representation. According to White, »the plot structure of a 
historical narrative (how things turned out as they did) and the formal argu-
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ment or explanation of why things happened or turned out as they did are 
prefigured by the original description (of the 'fact' to be explained) in a given 
dominant modality of language use: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche or 
irony«. The mode of metaphor will favour the archetype of Romance as a 
privileged mode of emplotment (»a mode of explanation that identifies knowl­
edge with the appreciation and delineation of the particularity and individual­
ity of things«). The mode of metonymy will favour a tragic plot structure (»as 
a privileged mode of emplotment and mechanistic casual connections as the 
favoured mode of explanation, to account for changes topographically out­
lined in the emplotment«). An ironic original description of the field will 
generate a tendency to favour emplotment in a satirical mode (and pragmatic 
or contextual explanation of the structures thus illuminated). And finally, 
themes originally described in the synecdochic mode will tend to generate 
comic emplotments (and organicist explanations of why these fields change as 
they do. (White 1982:128).
One might add that each of the linguistic modes of emplotment and modes of 
explanation has affinities with a specific ideological position. White divides 
them into four types: anarchist, radical, liberal and conservative. The suitabil­
ity of these terms could be discussed but there is no argument with his claim 
that »the issue of ideology points to the fact that there is no value-neutral mode 
of emplotment, explanation or even description of any field of events, whether 
imaginary or real, and suggests that the very use of language itself implies ... a 
specific posture before the world which is ethical, ideological or more gener­
ally political: not only all interpretation, but also all language is politically 
contaminated.« (White, 1982:129).
Deriving from this statement is the fact that the issue here is not »What are the 
facts? but rather, how are the facts to be described in order to sanction one 
mode of explaining them rather than another? Some people profess the view 
that history, for example, cannot become a science until it finds a technical 
terminology adequate to the correct characterisation of its object of study, in 
the way that physics did in calculus and chemistry did in the periodic table. 
Such is the recommendation of Praxists, Positivists, Cilometrians and so on. 
Others will continue to insist that the integrity of historiography depends on its 
use of ordinary language, its avoidance of jargon. The latter suppose that 
ordinary language is a safeguard against ideological deformation of the 'facts'. 
What they fail to recognise is that ordinary language itself has its own forms of 
terminological determinism, represented by the figures of speech without 
which discourse itself is impossible.« (White 1982:134).
Similar views to these are not infrequent, the strict scientific principle of 
objectivity was contemplated by some of Ranke's contemporaries (more openly
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after his death -  for example, his colleague Lorenz3 in 1891 ) and later this was 
repeatedly the subject of philosophical and historical discussion, especially in 
the times of the newly-discovered emancipation of philosophy of history 
(Hemple, 1942), and the period marked by Colingwood in the 60's. In the past 
quarter of the century -  when the theory of historiography gained importance 
and authors such as H.M. Baumgartner6, Karl-Oeorg Faber7, Jörn Rüsen8, and 
White9 stressed just the opposite -  here we have come across the belief that 
form makes history visible.10
»Geschichte existiert nicht solange sie nicht geschaffen wird« (Rosenstone 
1991), Ranke was told over one century and a half later by historians that 
dared to look left and right from their nose and proved that »the 'real' past is 
devoid of meaning and order«, and that in historical narrative, the systems of 
meaning peculiar to a culture or society are tested against the capacity of any 
set o f 'real' events to yield to such a system...
Finally, let us note that even some twenty years ago (around 1975) it was very 
hard to contemplate within the German historiographic debate (which is still 
the most authoritative in central Europe).11 German historiographers were still 
striving for some mutual (general) reference point for each concrete historical 
interpretation, which should precisely define what can be discussed and ac­
knowledged »as history«. They were (together with the historians in their
5 Ottokar Lorenz, Leopold von Ranke, Berlin 1891, p. 127, quoted here from Helmut Berding, 
»Leopold von Ranke«, in Hans-Urlich Wehler, Deutsche Historiker I, Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1971, p. 13.
6H.M.Baumgartner in his article »Narrative struktur und Objektivität. W ahrheitskriterium im 
historischen Wissen« (in Jörn Rüsen,Historische Objektivität. Aufsätze zur Geschichstheorie, 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1975), attempts to explain the true sense o f  objectivity, 
as well as the relation between objectivity and truth on the basis o f five argumentative steps or 
lines (»Argumentationsschritt«, »Argumentationsreihe«): 
the first step stresses the use o f the term »historical judgement«; 
the second covers the relation between objectivity and the truth;
the third attempts to find an answer to the question o f  whether objectivity can be ascribed to 
history at all and if  so, how;
the fourth explains expressions o f narrative structure, a relation between the narrative and the 
event and the time-related dependency o f  narrative organisation o f  past events; and 
the fifth analyses the connection between narrative structure and truth.
7Karl-Georg Faber, Theorie der Geschichtwissenschaft, C.H. Beck, Munich, 1982.
8 Jörg Rüsen, Zeit und Sinn. Die Strategien historischen Denkens, Fischer, Frankfurt, 1990.
’ Together with White, the discussion on these issues was brought to Europe by Dominick la 
Capra, Steven Kaplan and Martin Jay, just to mention a few.
10 Reinhardt Koselleck, »Wozu noch Historie?« in Wolfgang Hardtwig, Über das Studium der 
Geschichte, dtv, Munich, 1990, pp. 347-365.
11 A fine example o f  such views is the introduction by Jörn Rüsen in his book Historische 
Objektivität, pp 5-8.
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region of influence) aiming for clearly defined methods and a mutual sense of 
historic realisation »allgemeine Erkentniszwecke«). They repeatedly asserted 
that all they wanted was to make historiography as historical as possible (»es 
geht darum, die Geschichtswissenschaft so historish wie möglich zu machen«12).
The issue of the objectivity of historical realisation was thus at the centre of 
their discussions, proving the familiar and previously discussed tendency to 
make historiography scientific (»Wissenschaftlichkeit der Geschichtwissen- 
schaft«) and demonstrating a need for those »moments of historic realisation« 
that provide history with a »specially high degree of validity » (»einen besonders 
hohen Grad an Geltung verschaffen«13). Such views are extremely problem­
atic, because they put a historian in an unenviable position, particularly if he/ 
she wishes to remain faithful to the tradition of German philosophy of history. 
As a scientist, a historian is suddenly overburdened (»überfordet«). He/she is 
also faced with a demand for the argumentation of past practices of living as 
well as with expectations of favourable instructions for (different) procedures 
(»Handlungsmaximen«14).
In spite of such relativisations of the »principles of objectivity«, these final 
short conclusions clearly prove (hopefully) to what extent European discus­
sion -  in spite of Veyne's15 thematisation of intrigue -  really digressed from 
Ranke's »werwissenschaftlichung« of history or drew near to the new 
conceptualisation of metahistory.
One thing is already »clear«; a recent shift in historical thinking has brought -  
as Ginzburg would put it -  »the peripheral, blurred area between history and 
fiction close to the center of contemporary historiographical debate«.16
Or as Strout17 would say:«the widespread recognition that historical evidence 
is not 'a transparent medium', or 'an open window that gives us direct access to 
reality', is a crucial contribution to historical understanding«. It is also true on 
the other side, that drastic minimization of differences between fiction and 
history could contribute to the reduction of historiography to »arbitrary aes­
12 Ibid. p 7.
13 Ibid.
14 Karl-Georg Faber, »Objektivität in der Geschichtwissenschaft« and J. Rüsen, Historische 
Objektivität, p 10.
15 See Paul Veyne, Foucault revolution de l ’histoire, Edition du Seuil, Paris, 1978, German 
translation published in 1992. See also Paul Veyne, Der Eisberg der Geschichte,M er\e, Berlin, 
1981 and Paul Veyne, Aus der Geschichte, Merve, Berlin, 1986.
16 Carlo Ginzburg, »Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian«, Critical Inquiry 18, 
1991, p. 87.
17 Cushing Strout, »Border crossings: History, fiction and Dead Certainties«, History & Theory 
XXXI, No 1,1992
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thetic or political preferences« but we can really agree with those who claim 
that by turning the idea of evidence into »a wall, which by definition precludes 
any access to reality«, we get »a sort of inverted positivism«18. And we 
certainly can not agree with the statement that »narrativists« boast of their 
liberation from positivistic realism and in this way might minimise the chance 
of the historian enlarging historical understanding.
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